Debating Facebook: Facebook Viewed Traditionally

Facebook now has become new keyword in our Internet social networking. Recently some woman students from several traditional Islamic boarding schools (pondok pesantren) gathered to talk about Facebook—more precisely about its permissibility according to Islamic law, that is, past scholar opinions written in books known as kitab kuning (literally means yellow book, referring to paper usually used in printing those books). This gathering, which in Muslims’ traditional circle is known as bahth al-masa’il (literally investigating problems), has been a long handed-down tradition for generations to answer questions and solve problems asked to authority in traditional society in Indonesia.
Generally, there are some kinds of this meeting called bahth al-masa’il, such as its official form held by Nahdlatul Ulama. But, when done by students of pesantren, it is usually aimed primarily at improving their debate and problem-solving capabilities in order for them, when going home, to have such competences, rather than to officially state legal opinion (fatwa). It is a habit in it to have problems usually gathered from several pesantrens joining it. Questions raised in it reflect contemporary—usually popular—problems, which may be understood as everything which legal status is unknown before.
It is, then, not surprising at all that Facebook, seen as massive social phenomenon, draws attention to be discussed. As predicted, the conclusion of this assembly is that if Facebook is used in accordance with, or not violating, religious norms, then it should be legally allowed or even recommended in some cases, and if it is misused, e.g. used for pornography, it is forbidden.




Then, what is prohibited is not Facebook as is, rather its abuse. It is a fatwa based on maslahah (commonly rendered as public interest). Nothing is special in such legal opinion, moreover if we notice that many, if not most, problems, which has no clear prescription from Quran verses and Prophetic Traditions, has more often than not been dealt in terms of whether or not it has maslahah. Everybody who is familiar with that institution will admit this.
What is unusual, for me and perhaps for some other people acquainted with pesantren, is media attention. Mass medias seem to have blown up this topic over its proportion by exploitation—sounding a bit offensive ☺. This results in misunderstanding for, at least, two sides. First are those who strictly adhere to traditional authority, although it might be minority in comparison to other side. Second are people who see that pesantren has no longer ability to appropriately respond to contemporary issues.
Here I would like to provide you some links that may clarify this problem.
To make clear this read: http://www.facebook.com/inbox/readmessage.php?t=1072848385924&mbox_pos=0

Here you find the complete result of bahth al-masa’il held by FMP3 which legal opinion concerning Facebook is only one topic, among many, discussed.
http://www.4shared.com/file/107226033/a67e2513/Hasil_Bahtsul_Masail_FMP3_Jatim_Mei_2009.html

Read More...

Al-Ghazali on Love: Reading Kitab Al-Mahabbah of Ihya’ Ulum Al-Din

It is needless to say that al-Ghazali is among the greatest Muslim scholars, if not the greatest. He, for Muslims, is the hujjah al-Islam (the proof of Islam) and for Westerners is comparable to figures such as Augustine, Maimonides, Pascal and Kierkegaard. This acknowledgment from opposite civilizations, so to say, illustrates to us how big his influence is in both worlds. It is interesting to note that even Montgomery Watt, one of eminent Orientalist, takes al-Ghazali as sample to show functionality of the intellectuals within society, i.e, their contribution to society. He names al-Ghazali as “... one of the greatest intellectuals of Islamic society”. Another orientalist, Samuel Zwemer, writes a book which subtitle reveals deep respect to al-Ghazali, A Moslem Seeker After God: Showing Islam at its Best in the Life and Teaching of Al-Ghazali, Mystic and Theologian of the Eleventh Century.
This writing merely aims at briefly describing al-Ghazali’s life, while underlining some important facts which have impact on his sufism; al-Ghazali’s works which have been skillfully listed by Abd al-Rahman Badawi in his book; discussing generally al-Ghazali’s magnum opus, Ihya’ Ulum al-Din; studying his concept of love as elaborated in his Kitab al-Mahabbah, being part of Ihya’ Ulum al-Din comparing with the concept of love according to other Sufis; and finally drawing conclusion from that, insha Allah.




LIFE OF THE PROOF OF ISLAM
His complete name is Muhammad son of Muhammad son of Muhammad son of Ta’us Ahmad al-Ghazali al-Tusi al-Shafi’i. Among his surnames are Abu Hamid, the proof of Islam (hujjah al-Islam), the ornament of religion (zayn al-din) and many other attributes attached to him by his admirers. He was born in 450/1058 at Tus. Later on, he got his early education in Islamic jurisprudence at Tus to al-Imam Ahmad al-Radhakani. Afterward he went to Jurjan where he became a disciple of al-Imam Abu Nashr al-Ismai’ili. Here he started writing primarily on Islamic jurisprudence, the result of which undoubtedly is al-Ta’liqah fi al-Furu’. He also studied with the Sufi master Ahmad Ali al-Farmadhi, once pupil of Abu al-Qasim al-Qushayri, the latter is the author of al-Risalah which is a standard book in sufism. Another Sufi who had influenced al-Ghazali in this stage of his life is Yusuf al-Nassaj, about whom al-Ghazali say “At the beginning of my career, I knew nothing of the spiritual states of the righteous and the stations of the gnostics until I associated with my Shaykh Yusuf al-Nassaj in Tus ...”. These facts explain the early influence on al-Ghazali in matter of sufism.
Decisive time in his life came when he arrived in 419/1077 at Nishapur in which he studied with the eminent scholar Abu al-Ma’ali al-Juwayni, surnamed Imam al-Haramayn (the leader of two Holy cities), under whose supervision al-Ghazali studied multi-discipline knowledge. He learned Islamic jurisprudence of Shafi’ite school, principles of Islamic jurisprudence, dialectic, logic, theology, and read philosophy. He remained student of Imam al-Haramayn until Imam’s death in 478/1085.
After his master’s death, al-Ghazali went to Vizier Nizam al-Mulk who used to gather the great Muslim scholars and the Sufis to learn from. In 484/1091, Nizam al-Mulk appointed al-Ghazali, at 34, to teach in the famous al-Nizamiyah school. At this time, al-Ghazali’s fame become so widespread, that, it is said, four hundreds of great scholars of the time came to his lectures. This period of his life was also marked by productivity, in which he wrote many books in different disciplines and did not stop reading, especially books of the Sufi. This restless pursuit of knowledge sequentially will change his life dramatically and resulted in his pilgrimage to Mecca with intention not to go back to Baghdad.
The turning point of al-Ghazali’s life which changes entirely his life and then has deep influence on Muslim world started at 488/1095, in which he went on a pilgrimage to Mecca, and afterward went to Sham where he lived for ten years. In this era, he spent his time mostly in solitude and refining soul, as Sufi would call it. Resulting from this solitary life are many books, most notable of which is Ihya Ulum al-Din (revivification of religious sciences). After spending ten years in solitude, al-Ghazali went back to his native land, Tus. In 499/1106, after strong insistence from the Vizier and consultation with a number of Sufis, al-Ghazali taught again in Nizamiyah school.
Not long after having taught in Nizamiyah, he decided to go back to Tus where he established college for students and khanqah for Sufis. He died at fourteenth of Jumada al-Akhirah 505/1111, while learning two collections of Prophetic Traditions, that of al-Bukhari and Muslim. May Allah give him peace.

AL-GHAZALI’S BOOKS
Al-Ghazali had, and still has, played manifold roles and significantly influences many parts of Muslim world. He is an Islamic jurist (faqih), a theologian, a philosopher—though he destructed philosophy—and a Sufi. It is as the late Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar Mustafa al-Maraghi said that “When al-Ghazali is remembered, it does not occur to our mind only one man (with specific ability), on the contrary, several men with particular capacity come come to mind. Come to mind, at once, al-Ghazali of expert in fundamental of Islamic jurisprudence (al-usuli al-hadziq), al-Ghazali of Islamic jurist (al-faqih al-hurr), al-Ghazali of theologian and the leader of (practice of) Prophetic tradition (al-mutakallim imam al-sunnah), al-Ghazali of sociologist who knows the world’s condition (al-ijtima’i al-khabir bi ahwal al-alam), al-Ghazali of philosopher who opposes philosophy and unveils within it falsity, al-Ghazali of educator, and al-Ghazali of Sufi and ascetic”. So far as testimony of al-Ghazali prolificacy is concerned, we will find not only that of Muslim but also from Western community. Eric Ormsby, commenting a period between 1094-5 within which al-Ghazali wrote no less than eight or nine works, writes “... I can think of no other example in intellectual history, East or West, of such intese and proliffic engagement over shorr so short a span of time, and with such fruitful results”.
His influence can be seen until now through his extensive works on various fields. Abd al-Rahman Badawi classifies al-Ghazali’s works into that which al-Ghazali’s authorship is certain; works which is not certainly written by him; works which is more probably not written by him; works which have different titles or have been separated; works ascribed to al-Ghazali which is in fact not his (manhulah); works which identity is not known (majhulah); and manuscripts which are attributed to him. Here, I will list only his books of which his authorship is certain, according to Badawi, in Islamic jurisprudence and its principles and works in sufism. The choice of mine which to display is somewhat arbitrary.
In Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) not only he writes books on Islamic jurisprudence but he writes several books on principles of Islamic jurisprudence (usul fiqh). As to the first, he writes al-Ta’liqah fi Furu’ al-Madhhab (probably being the first to be written as related in stories about his earliest study), al-Basith fi al-Furu’ which is said to have been a summarized version of his master’s book Nihayah al-Mathlab fi Dirayah al-Madhhab, al-Wasith, al-Wajiz, and Khulasah al-Mukhtasar wa Naqawah al-Mu’tasar. These books occupy important place in the chain of Islamic jurisprudence books of Shafi’ite school and mostly had been written during early part of his life. Concerning the second al-Ghazali writes—as listed by Abd al-Rahman Badawi in his Muallafat al-Ghazali—al-Mankhul fi al-Usul, Shifa’ al-Ghalil fi al-Qiyas wa al-Ta’lil, Kitab fi Mas’alah Kull Mujtahid Musib, Tahdzib al-Ushul, Kitab Asas al-Qiyas, and al-Mustasfa min Ilm al-Usul.
Among the first to be written by al-Ghazali concerning sufism, following Badawi’s list, is Mizan al-Amal which was written before his period of solitude. On this subject, after that, al-Ghazali wrote Ihya’ Ulum al-Din, al-Maqsad al-Asna fi Sharh Asma’ Allah al-Husna, Bidayah al-Hidayah, Kitab al-Arba’in fi Usul al-Din, Kitab al-Madlnun bih ala Ghayr Ahlih, al-Madlnun bih ala Ahlih, Kimiya’ al-Sa’adah (written in Persia), Ayyuha al-Walad (of Persian origin translated and given this name by another scholar), al-Risalah al-Wa’ziyyah, al-Risalah al-Ladunniyah, Mishkat al-Anwar, al-Kashf wa al-Tabyin fi Ghurur al-Khalq Ajma’in, Tablis Iblis or Tadlis Iblis, al-Munqidh min al-Dlalal wa al-Mufsih an al-Ahwal or wa al-Muwsil ila Dzi al-Izzah wa al-Jalal, al-Imla’ ala Mushkil al-Ihya, al-Istidraj, al-Durrah al-Fakhirah fi Kashf Ulum al-Akhirah, Sirr al-Alamayn wa Kashf ma fi al-Darayn, Asrar Mu’amalat al-Din, and Minhaj al-Abidin ila Jannah Rabb al-Alamin. Among these books, his masterpiece is undoubtedly Ihya’ Ulum al-Din.

REVIVIFYING RELIGIOUS SCIENCES
Badawi lists 109 places in which Ihya’ manuscript is there. He also mentions books written in defending Ihya’, in refusing Ihya’, its commentary, its abdrigments, all of which are thirty nine. added to this list is a number of translations and studies mostly done in Western countries. Ormsby describes it as “A book like no other ”. The reason for this is because “It ranges from the most minute and mundane of details ... to the most lofty subject” and “It is simultaneously a compendium of law, sacred tradition, theology and philosophy, and Sufi lore and theory, as well as a vivid, if inadvertent, depiction of a world”.
This great book is divided into four quarters (rubu’), each of which is comprised of ten books. The number forty has significant meaning as as is repeatedly used in the Holy Qur’an to describe something merit, such as the story of Prophet Moses. In Sufi circle, the number forty means days in which the wayfarer (salik) must go through at the beginning of his Path. The first quarter is the matters of worship (ibadat), which consists of book of knowledge, book of pillars of faith (qawa’id al-aqa’id), book of secrets of ritual purity (asrar al-thaharah), of prayer and its importance (al-salah wa muhimmatiha), of almsgiving, of fasting, of pilgrimage, book of etiquette of reciting Qur’an (adab tilawah al-Qur’an), book of recollections of God name (adhkar) and free prayers (da’awat), and book of supererogatory and extracanonical devotions (tartib al-awrad wa tafsil ihya’ al-layl). The second quarter deals with customs (al-adat), which concerns with daily life’s matter. The books of this quarter are book of etiquette of eating (kitab adab al-akl), of marriage, of earning one’s living and engaging in business (al-kasb wa al-ma’ash), of the lawful and unlawful, of relation with friends and relatives (al-ulfah wa al-ukhuwwah wa al-suhbah), of seclusion (al-uzlah), of traveling (al-safar), and the use of music (al-sam’ wa al-wajd), of enjoining good and forbidding bad, and of daily life and ethics of Prophet Muhammad (al-ma‘ishah wa akhlaq al-nubuwwah).
After dealing with external aspects in two previous quarters, al-Ghazali elaborates internal aspects in two sequent quarters. In the third quarter, he explains things leading to destruction (al-muhlikat), which is made up of book of mysteries of the heart (kitab ‘ajaib al-qalb), of exercising soul and refining characters (riyadlah al-nafs wa tahdhib al-akhlaq), dangerousness of appetites for food and sexual intercourse (afat al-shahwatayn al-bathn wa al-farj), on the weaknesses of the tongue (afat al-lisan), on anger and envy (afat al-ghadb wa al-hiqd wa al-hasad), on censuring worldliness (dhamm al-dunya), on avarice (dhamm al-bukhl wa hubb al-mal), on hypocrisy and love of fame (dhamm al-jah wa al-riya’), on pride and vanity (dhamm al-kibr wa al-‘ujb), and on self-deception (al-ghurur). In the fourth quarter, al-Ghazali describes things leading to salvation (al-munjiyat), which is comprised of book of repentance (kitab al-tawbah), of patience and gratitude (al-sabr wa al-shukr), of fear and hope (al-khawf wa al-raja’), of poverty and asceticism (al-faqr wa al-zuhd), of asserting God's unity and trusting in Him (al-tawhid wa al-tawakkul), of love, longing, intimacy, and contentment (al-mahabbah wa al-shawq wa al-uns wa al-ridla), of intention, sincerity, and purity of intention (al-niyyah wa al-sidq wa al-ikhlas), of self-examination and contemplation (al-muraqabah wa al-muhasabah), of meditation (al-tafakkur), of death and the life to come (dhikr al-mawt wa ma ba’dah).
All these books are usually started, after opening section, with Qur’anic and prophetic quotations and sayings of pious people of the past giving ground for what is discussed. After giving enough basis on which to build, al-Ghazali starts to discuss what he want to do in each chapter. Taking such steps, he tries to set up three authorities, that is, of the Holy Qur’an, of Prophetic Tradition, and of Sufi masters. The order by which al-Ghazali arranges Ihya’ in progression manner from the humblest obligation to the loftiest one reveals that each new theme depends on the previous without having to neglect the first. It is, thus, hierarchical and circular at once.

REACHING THE ULTIMATE GOAL: LOVE AS THE CULMINATION OF STATIONS
The complete title of section in which al-Ghazali explores his theory of love is book of love and longing and intimacy and contentment (kitab al-mahabbah wa al-shawq wa al-uns wa al-ridla), being a sixth book of quarter of (explanation of) things leading to salvation (al-munjiyat). This book contains eighteenth following chapters: explanation of evidences from Shara’ for servant’s love to God; of real meaning of love, its causes, and to find real meaning of servant’s love to God; of that the only One who deserves love is God; of that the greatest and highest pleasure is knowing Him (ma’rifah), of cause of excellency of looking (nazar) in the hereafter’s pleasure over knowing (ma’rifah) in this world; of causes for strengthening love God; of cause of people gradation in love; of cause for people lack of knowledge of Him; of meaning of longing for Him; of His love to servant and its meaning; statement on signs of servant’s love to God; explanation of meaning of intimacy with God; of meaning of heart’s widening (inbisath) fruiting from prevailing intimacy; statement on meaning of contentment in God’s destiny, its real meaning, and its virtue; explanation of the real meaning of contentment and its possibility in things contrary to natural desire; that prayer does not negate contentment; of that escaping from places of sins does not negate contentment; and of stories about lovers, their statements, and their unveilings (mukashafat). From this long list chapters, relevant sections to be read are the first two sections and tenth section. The first is important for grasping Shari’ah and Sufi tradition basis on which al-Ghazali build his theory of love. The second part is elaboration of servant’s love according to al-Ghazali’s theory of love. The tenth section is to explore God’s love according to this theory.
For al-Ghazali love is the ultimate station toward which the previous stations, such as repentance and asceticism, is directed and from which the succeeding stations, like longing and intimacy, origin. He even goes further as to say that love to God and His Messenger is an obligation. In response to those people who deny the existence of love and interpret love, when occurs in the Holy Qur’an and Prophetic Tradition, to be the obedience, he says “How can it be obliged what does not exist and how can love be interpreted with obedience whereas, in fact, it follows from it and is its fruit. To prove this fact, he provides evidences, as he usually does Ihya’, from the Holy Qur’an, Prophetic Tradition, and sayings of the past pious.
Among the clear statement in the Holy Qur’an which convey to us the existence of Divine Love and servant’s love is “God loves them and they love Him”. Still, servant’s love has degrees as in “But those who believe love God more ardently”. The case is more clear when it comes to Prophetic Tradition, as the Prophet saw., in many Traditions, characterizes love as prerequisite for belief (iman). He saw. also commands his followers to love God, saying “Love God for blessings he has given you and love me for God loves me”. One of the Prophet’s prayer is “O God, give me your love, love of those who love you, love of things that make me closer to you. And make your love dearer to me than cold water”. After quoting verses of the Holy Qur’an and Prophetic Traditions, al-Ghazali proceeds with recording some sayings of Abu Bakar al-Siddiq, al-Hasan al-Basri, Abu Sulayman al-Darani, and even Prophet Isa as. Keeping in mind various citation made above, love is already plain thing (amr zahir), as al-Ghazali put it, and the obscurity only occurs in its real meaning, which will be the subject of al-Ghazali’s elaboration.
Al-Ghazali mentions four basic principles to understand love. The first is that love is impossible without knowing (ma’rifah) and perception (idrak) or, to put it differently, both are preconditions for love. Since without knowing and perceiving thing, one cannot love that thing. Therefore, animal’s love is inconceivable for it has no faculty for knowing and perceiving as human being has. The objects perceived (mudrakat) can be either compatible with one’s nature and, thus giving pleasure to him; or in conflict with one’s nature and paining him; or neither both. Thereby, everything giving pleasure to someone is his beloved (mahbub); what one perceives to be painful, he hates it; what is neither the first nor the second is neither beloved nor hated. Then, love is the inclination of one’s nature toward object which gives pleasure (mayl al-tab‘ ila al-shay’ al-mulidhdh).
The second is that since love follows knowledge and perception, then it is imperative that it is divided according to the faculties of knowledge and perception. Every faculty has its own pleasure in its different object. Eyes love beauty, ears love beautiful sounds, and so on. To support this, al-Ghazali reports Prophetic Tradition: “It was made dear (hubbiba) to me three worldly things of yours, i.e., perfume and women. And my spiritual pleasure (qurrah ‘ayni) is made within prayer”. And the strongest faculty to know and perceive is inner faculty which can be referred to as reason (al-aql), light (al-nur), or heart (al-qalb). It follows, from the fact that inner perception is the stronger compared to that of five senses (al-hawass al-khamsah), that one’s inclination toward what is perceived through internal faculty is more powerful and more perfect. It is only those who cannot use their inner sense to perceive divine things will deny the existence of divine love.
The third principle is about explanation of causes which bring about love. The first cause is human being’s natural inclination to love him self, which means his love to his continuous existence and his hate to his non-existence. It also means his love to his perfect existence. From this results love safety of one’s organ, son, family, property, and friends. This love is not for the sake of themselves (la li‘ayaniha), but because their connection with his own interest (lirtibathi hazzih). T The second cause of love is doing good (ihsan). Because it is natural character of human being to love, i.e., to be inclined to, someone who is doing good to him (muhsin). Love caused by doing good is closely related to the that of first kind, that is, to love one’s self. The third to give rise to love is love to people who do good to others although do not do good to the lover. The fourth factor for is love for a thing for virtue of itself (lidhatih), which is true love and guaranteed to be eternal. He gives example like one’s love for beauty, for every beauty is loved by one who perceives it and this love is for the sake of that beauty not for something external to that beauty. The fifth cause is hidden affinity (munasabah khafiyyah) between lover and beloved, for there might be two persons who love each other not because of beauty nor interest (hazz), as the Prophet said: “spirits are regimented battalions (junud mujannadah)”, those who know one another (ta’arafa) associate familiarity together (i’talafa), while those which do not know one another (tanakara) remain at variance (ikhtalafa). Finally, since the Prophet has said that “Indeed God is beauteous and loves beauty”, one to whom His beauty has been revealed will certainly love Him.
The fourth principle is about explanation of beauty. According to al-Ghazali beauty is everything that is perceived by any faculty of perception as beautiful, i.e., giving pleasure. Generally speaking, he defines beauty as “the presence of object’s possible and befitting perfection” (an yahdlura kamaluh al-la’iq bih al-mumkin lah). And everything, sensible or not, has its own specific definition of beauty which is suited for it. The horse beauty is not the same as human beauty and so is the case with other beauties. Closing this section, al-Ghazali says that if all these causes unite in one person, then, love will indeed be multiplied and since these causes are impossible to be united perfectly other than in God, it follows that God is the only One who really deserves love.
As to divine love to human being, al-Ghazali starts his elaboration by quoting Qur’anic verses and Prophetic Traditions which to justify the divine love. He cites “He loves them and they love Him”, “Indeed God loves those who fight for His sake in line”, and “God loves those who repent and those who cleanse themselves” and Prophetic Tradition, to cite the most important, “When my servant constantly draws near to me by works of supererogation, then do I love him, and once I started to love him, I become his eye by which he sees, his ear by which he hears, and his tongue by which he speaks”.
He insists that divine love is real (haqiqah) not metaphorical (majaz). However, love’s significance when attributed to Him is not the same as that attributed to creatures, that is, one’s inclination toward object that gives pleasure and conditioned by causes mentioned above. It is also the case with other God’s attributes. Divine love, then, must be interpreted (mua’wwal) to mean unveiling the veil (kashf al-hijab) from servant’s heart so that he may behold Him with his heart and to mean His strengthening (tamkinuh) for him to draw close to Him. Ultimately, it is His bringing near (taqribuH) from himself by erasing from his sin and purifying his self from worldly dirties and unveiling the veil from his heart so he may be able to contemplate Him (yushahiduH) as he sees Him by his heart. Therefore, this nearness should be understood not in terms of space and time but in good qualities.
If we compare al-Ghazali’s theory of love, we will find that it resembles that of Sufis before him. Al-Kalabadhi records many sayings of Sufis one of which is that of al-Junayd defining “Love is hearts’ inclination”, which al-Kalabadhi interprets as “when one’s heart is inclined to God and to what belongs to Him without pretension (takalluf)”. Al-Qushayri in his book interprets God’s love to his servant as “His will to have blessing upon him”. However, unlike al-Ghazali, he regards it as state (hal). Similar to al-Qushayri, al-Sarraj considers love as state rather than station. He defines condition of love as “When one looks at what God has given him, and sees with his heart to His proximity to him ... and contemplates with his faith and his real certitude (haqiqah yaqinih) to ... His eternal love to him, then he loves Him”.
As a conclusion we may say that al-Ghazali’s theory of love is based, more or less, on his predecessors’ theory. His definition of love as natural inclination can be traced back to al-Junayd definition. As to his conception of divine love, we can clearly discover resemblance with that of al-Qushayri. However, we can clearly see newness in his elaboration of love and of other mystical stations, thanks to his great expertise in explanation and his various readings. Wa Allah ‘Alam wa Huwa Muwaffiquna li ma Yuhibbuh wa Yardlah.

endnotes:

[1] Eric Ormsby, Ghazali, Makers of Muslim World, p. ix.
[2] W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazali, p. 1.
[3] Margaret Smith, al-Ghazali the Mystic, p. 9.
[4] Salih Ahmad al-Shami, al-Imam al-Ghazali Hujjah al-Islam wa Mujaddid al-Mi’ah al-Khamisah, p. 20.
[5] Eric Ormsby, op. cit., p. 26.
[6] Margaret Smith, op. cit., p. 14.
[7] Salih Ahmad al-Shami, op. cit., pp. 20- 1. Cf. Margaret Smith, op. cit., pp. 15-8.
[8] Salih Ahmad al-Shami, ibid., pp. 21-5.
[9] To know the detailed process by which al-Ghazali’s life transformed see Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (a), al-Munqidh min al-Dlalal wa al-Musil ila Dhi al-Izzah wa al-Jalal, pp. 100-6.
[10] Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (a), ibid., p. 104.
[11] Salih Ahmad al-Shami, op. cit., p. 25-6.
[12] Margaret Smith, op. cit., p. 31.
[13] Salih Ahmad al-Shami, op. cit., p. 27-8.
[14] Quoted from Abdul Karim al-Uthman, Sirah al-Ghazali wa Aqwal al-Mutaqaddimin fih, p. 11.
[15] Eric Ormsby, op. cit., p. 90.
[16] Abd al-Rahman Badawi, Muallafat al-Ghazali, pp. 1-238.
[17] Ibid., pp. 239-76.
[18] Ibid., pp. 277-302.
[19] Ibid., pp. 303-52.
[20] Ibid., pp. 352-88.
[21] Ibid., pp. 389-426.
[22] Ibid., pp. 427-468.
[23] For detailed list see Abd al-Rahman Badawi, op. cit., pp. 2-238, which list books which authorship is certainly al-Ghazali’s.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Abd al-Rahman Badawi, op. cit., pp. 98-111.
[26] Ibid., pp.112-8.
[27] Ibid,. pp. 118-22.
[28] Eric Ormsby, op. cit., p. 111.
[29] Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, p. 94.
[30] Eric Ormsby, op. cit., p. 114.
[31] Ibid., p. 118.
[32] Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (b), Ihya’ Ulum al-Din, p. 257.
[33] The Holy Qur’an, V: 54.
[34] The Holy Qur’an, II: 165.
[35] Reported by al-Tirmidhi from Ibn Abbas as a good hadith, Zayn al-Din Abd al-Rahim al-Iraqi, al-Mughni ‘an Haml al-Asfar fi al-Asfar fi Takhrij ma fi al-Ihya’ min al-Akhbar, p. 258.
[36] Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (b), op. cit., pp. 258-9.
[37] Ibid., p. 259.
[38] Ibid. Cf. Binyamin Abrahamov, Divine Love in Islamic Mysticism, the Teachings of al-Ghazali and al-Dabbagh, p. 44.
[39] Reported by al-Nasa’i without word thalath (three), Zayn al-Din al-Iraqi, op. cit., pp. 259-60.
[40] Reported by Muslim, Zayn al-Din al-Iraqi, op. cit., p. 261.
[41] Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (b), op. cit., pp. 260-2.
[42] Ibid., pp. 261-2.
[43] Ibid.,
[44] The Holy Qur’an, V: 54.
[45] The Holy Qur’an, LXI: 4.
[46] The Holy Qur’an, II: 222.
[47] Reported by al-Bukhari, Zayn al-Din al-Iraqi, op. cit., p. 285.
[48] Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (b), op. cit., p. 285.
[49] Ibid., pp. 285-7.
[50 ] M. Umaruddin, The Ethical Philosophy of al-Ghazali, p. 180.
[51] Abu Bakar Muhammad al-Kalabadhi, al-Ta’arruf li Madhhab Ahl al-Tasawwuf, p. 128.
[52] Abu al-Qasim Abd al-Karim al-Qushayri, al-Risalah al-Qushayriyah fi ‘Ilm al-Tasawwuf, p. 318.
[53] Abu Nasr Abd Allah al-Sarraj, al-Luma‘ fi Tarikh al-Tasawwuf al-Islami, p. 61.





BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abrahamov, Binyamin. Divine Love in Islamic Mysticism, the Teachings of al-Ghazali and al- Dabbagh. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. 2003.
Badawi, Abd al-Rahman. Muallafat al-Ghazali. Al-Kuwayt: Wakalah al-Mathbu‘at. 1977.
Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad al-. al-Munqidh min al-Dlalal wa al-Musil ila Dhi al-Izzah wa al-Jalal. Beirut: Dar al-Andalus. 1967.
---. Ihya’ Ulum al-Din. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah. 1998.
Iraqi, Zayn al-Din Abd al-Rahim al-. al-Mughni ‘an Haml al-Asfar fi al-Asfar fi Takhrij ma fi al-Ihya’ min al-Akhbar (on the margin of Ihya’ Ulum al-Din). Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah. 1998.
Kalabadhi, Abu Bakar Muhammad al-. al-Ta’arruf li Madhhab Ahl al-Tasawwuf. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah. 1993.
Ormsby, Eric. Ghazali, Makers of Muslim World. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. 2007.
Qushayri, Abu al-Qasim Abd al-Karim al-. al-Risalah al-Qushayriyah fi ‘Ilm al-Tasawwuf. Beirut: al-Maktabah al-Asriyah. 2001.
Sarraj, Abu Nasr Abd Allah al-. al-Luma‘ fi Tarikh al-Tasawwuf al-Islami. Cairo: al-Tawfikia Bookshop.
Schimmel, Annemarie. Mystical Dimensions of Islam. New Delhi: Yoda Press.
Shami, Salih Ahmad al-. al-Imam al-Ghazali Hujjah al-Islam wa Mujaddid al-Mi’ah al-Khamisah. Damascus: Dar al-Qalam. 1993.
Smith, Margaret. al-Ghazali the Mystic. Lahore: Hijra International Publishers. 1983.
Umaruddin, M. The Ethical Philosophy of al-Ghazali. Delhi: Adam Publishers and Distributers. 1996.
Uthman, Abdul Karim al-. Sirah al-Ghazali wa Aqwal al-Mutaqaddimin fih. Damascus: Dar al-Fikr.
Watt, W. Montgomery. Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazali. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 1971.

Read More...

Degress of Certitude in Islamic Mysticism

One of central concept within Islamic mysticism is that of yaqin which is translated as certitude or certainty. It is often considered for many as a goal toward which wayfarer (salik) has to head. In the Holy Quran from which the Sufis draw inspiration and terms they use, we find three things attributed to certitude, that are, ilm (knowledge), ‘ayn (eye or essence), haqq (real or reality). These attributes are used to mark degrees to which certitude belongs. The present paper will try to examine certitude in its connection with these three attributes.
According to al-Jurjani in his al-Ta’rifat, the word yaqin literally means unshakeable knowledge, and then is used to mean knowing thing as it really is and being convinced that this reality is not mutable. Other opinion says that it is heart’s tranquility on what really thing is. Ibn Manzhur explains yaqin as heart’s being filled with decisive faith accompanied with firmness of judgment. Yaqin, considering its meaning of verifying things (tathabbut min al-amr), has three opposites, that is, wahm (false impression), shakk (doubt), and zhann (conjecture). All these meanings can be traced in its root YQN, which signifies, when related to water, its steady and changeless. It also can originate from al-yaqnu, signifying piece of wood in the sailor’s hand used as a tool to run the boat. What is attempted here is first to collect various sayings of Sufis concerning this matter.
Talking about what theologians (mutakallimun) term, al-Ghazali explains that there are four things as to extents of soul inclination to belief. The first is shakk (doubt and uncertainty). It occurs when one does not prefer one possibility among two or more alternatives. The second is zhann (supposition while admitting that the contrary may be the case). It is the soul's inclination toward one of possible things. The third is i’tiqad (belief), that is, when soul believes in something and have no alternatives other than that thing, while there is no certain knowledge to support that belief. The fourth is yaqin (certainty). It is when soul knows something and does not doubt it at all, gained by demonstrative evidences and has no possibility to doubt it.



EARLY SUFIS ON YAQIN
I mean by early Sufis those who wrote book on sufism and those whose sayings are quoted before al-Ghazali. Here I will use representative works, such as al-Luma’ of al-Sarraj, al-Ta’aruf of al-Kalabadhi, and al-Risalah of al-Qushairi. In al-Luma’, al-Sarraj categorizes yaqin as one of the states (al-ahwal), contrasted to stations (al-maqamat). He defines al-ahwal as “something happening to the hearts”, furthermore, quoting al-Junaid, it is something descending to the hearts, therefore not lasting. The similar definition is given by al-Hujwiri, defining state as “something that descends from God into a man’s heart, without his being able to repel it when it comes, or to attract it when it goes, by his own effort”.
As to yaqin, al-Sarraj equates it to al-mukashafah (mystical vision), which is, according to him, divided into three kinds; direct vision by sights in the day of judgment, heart vision of the realities of faith (haqa’iq al-iman), and vision of signs by revealing divine sovereignty to the prophets with miracles and to the saints. In contrast to al-Sarraj, al-Qushairi classifies yaqin among spiritual stations (al-maqamat). It is nineteenth station. He identifies three things to indicate yaqin in oneself. They are seeing God in everything, returning to Him in every affair, and seeking His help in every condition.
Al-Kalabadhi collects several sayings of early Sufis concerning yaqin. Al-Junayd says “yaqin is the absence of doubt”, al-Nuri says “yaqin is vision”, and Dzu al-Nun says “what eyes see is related to knowledge, and what hearts see is related to yaqin”.

IBN ARABI ON YAQIN
According to Ibn Arabi, yaqin is noble station between knowledge and tranquility (thuma’ninah). It is whatever one really knows of and soul already accepts, whether or not it already happens. The reason as to why it is divided into three stages is because something could be certitude without having to be knowledge, or vision, or real. It has four pillars, three of which has been widely known is to be found in the Holy Quran and one is reality of certitude. This last is based on Prophetic Tradition which says ”For every truth (haqq), there is reality (haqiqah)”, from which Ibn 'Arabi deduces that for haqq al-yaqin, there is too haqiqat al-yaqin (reality of certitude). Therefore, there are four pillars for yaqin, that is, ‘ilm, ‘ayn, haqq, and haqiqah.
He continues to say that since in the world of meanings (‘alam al-ma‘ani), yaqin is comprised of four things, so is the case with the world of words and expressions (‘alam al-alfazh wa al-‘ibarat), in which word yaqin is made up of four letters; sound al-ya', al-qaf, al-ya' al-mu'tallah and al-nun. Furthermore, Ibn ‘Arabi explores these letters and their correspondence with macrocosm (al-‘alam al-kabir), the world of bodies (‘alam al-abdan), and the world of spirits (‘alam al-abdan).
In the chapter 269 of his magnum opus, al-Futuhat al-Makkiyah, Ibn ‘Arabi immediately expounds what these three stages of yaqin mean. He explains the first as “something given by evidence which accept no doubt”, the second as “something given by direct contemplation (al-mushahadah) and unveiling (al-kashf)”, and the third as “knowledge coming to the heart concerning the reason of that contemplation”.
Defining yaqin as heart’s steadfastness on something, Ibn ‘Arabi gives example the Ka’bah in Mecca. After knowing that the Ka’bah is in Mecca and there is no doubt about this, which is termed as ‘ilm al-yaqin, one may directly see it and, thus, gain ‘ayn al-yaqin, which is more that what he alrealy knows about the Ka’bah. This vision brings about in him taste (dhawq) of what he is seeing, relating to its form and condition. Haqq al-yaqin occurs when God opens his insight as to reason this Ka’bah has been chosen as His house around which pilgrims circumambulate.

IBN AL-QAYYIM ON YAQIN
He is not among the scholars known as Sufi, even some consider him in contrast position. Notwithstanding with this common opinion, he has, however, commentary commentary to al-Harawi’s Manazil al-Sa’irin. Ibn al-Qayyim treats Sufi Doctrines as explanation to the Holy Quran, as elucidated from the title of his work Madarij al-Salikin bayn Manazil Iyyaka Na‘budu wa Iyyaka Nasta‘in.
According to Ibn al-Qayyim, yaqin is the goal of the gnostics (al-arifin) and, when added to it patience (shabr), a man has qualification to be a leader, alluding to the Holy Quran. Yaqin is spirit of heart’s works which are spirits of bodies’ works. It is the reality of the (station of) purity (haqiqah al-shiddiqiyah). It is the axis around which tasawwuf centers. When a salik arrives at yaqin, it comes, then, love of God, fear of Him, gratitude to Him, trust in Him, and return to Him. Commenting whether it is God-giving (wahbi) or achievable (kasbi), Ibn al-Qayyim says that it is kasbi, viewing its causes, and wahbi, considering itself.
Concerning degrees of yaqin, al-Harawi, whose book Ibn al-Qayyim comments, says that it has three degrees, the first is ‘ilm al-yaqin, ‘ayn al-yaqin, and haqq al-yaqin. The first is accepting what appears from the Truth, accepting what disappears for the Truth, and being aware of His Names, Attributes, and Actions. As to the first thing to constitute yaqin, that is, accepting what appears from the Truth, Ibn al-Qayyim says that it is His commands, prohibitions, law, and religion which come through His messengers. We should accept and follow them. Concerning the second, which is accepting what disappears from the Truth, it is the faith in the Unseen (al-ghayb) about which the Truth has reported through His messenger tongues. The third is knowledge of tawhid (declaring God’s oneness), that is, knowing His beautiful Names, Attributes, and absolute perfectness.
The second level of certitude is that of ‘ayn al-yaqin (vision of certitude), i.e., direct vision sufficient from formal information and direct contemplation breaking the veil of knowledge. It is when one sees what he, before, firmly knows. To put it in other word, it is certitude gained through true information and, then, intensified by direct vision.
Haqq al-yaqin (real certitude), according to Ibn al-Qayyim, is not attainable in this worldly life with the exception of the messengers of God, such the Prophet’s ascension in which he saw with his eye heaven and hell; and prophet Moses experience of God's manifestation in Mount Sinai. He, however, does not reject possibility of our tasting of haqq al-yaqin, with regard to realities of faith relating with one's heart and its actions, for it really tastes them. With reference to the matters of the Hereafter, such as directly seeing God, really hearing His words without medium, the believers’ portion of them is faith and ‘ilm al-yaqin, and haqq al-yaqin would be attained in the Hereafter.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abd al-Razzaq, Mahmud. Al-Mu’jam al-Shufi. Dar Majid Usayri: Jeddah. 2004
Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad al-. Ihya ‘Ulum al-Din. Semarang: Karya Toha Putra.
Jurjani, Ali bin Muhammad al-. Kitab al-Ta'rifat. Al-Mathba'ah al-Khairiyah.
Ibn ‘Ajibah, Abu al-‘Abbas Ahmad. Iqazh al-Himam. Dar Jawami‘ al-Kalim: Cairo.
Ibn ‘Arabi, Muhy al-Din. Al-Futuhat al-Makkiyah. Dar Shadir: Beirut. 2004.
---. Kitab al-Yaqin. Dar Akhbar al-Yaum.
Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Abu Abd Allah Muhammad bin Abi Bakr. Madarij al-Salikin bayn Manazil Iyyaka Na’budu wa Iyyaka Nasta’in. Muassasah al-Mukhtar: Cairo. 2001.
Kalabadhi, Abu Bakar Muhammad bin Ishaq al-. Al-Ta’arruf li Madhhab Ahli al-Tasawwuf. Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah: Beirut. 1993.
Sarraj, Abd Allah bin Ali al-. Al-Luma. Al-Tawfikia Bookshop: Cairo.
Schimmel, Annemarie. Mystical Dimension of Islam. Yoda Press: New Delhi.
Qushairi, Abu al-Qasim Abd al-Karim al-. Al-Risalah al-Qushairiyah. Al-Maktabah al-Ashriyah: Beirut.

endnotes:
[1]Ali bin Muhammad Al-Jurjani, Kitab al-Ta’rifat, h. 113.
[2] Ibn Manzhur, Lisan al-Arab in Mahmud Abd al-Razzaq, al-Mu’jam al-Shufi, v 3, p. 1072.
[3] Mahmud Abd al-Razzaq, ibid., pp. 1073-4.
[4] Abu al-Abbas Ahmad bin ‘Ajibah al-Hasani, Iqazh al-Himam fi Syarh al-Hikam, p. 310.
[5] Muhy al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi (a), Kitab al-Yaqin, p. 52.
[6] Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum al-Din, v. I, p. 72.
[7] Abu Nashr Abd Allah bin Ali al-Sarraj, al-Luma’, p. 46.
[8] Quoted from Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimension of Islam, p. 99.
[9] Ibid., pp. 73-4.
[10] Abu al-Qasim Abd al-Karim al-Qushairi, al-Risalah al-Qushairiyah, p. 180.
[11] Abu Bakar Muhammad bin Ishaq al-Kalabadhi, al-Ta’aruf li Madhhab Ahli al-Tasawwuf, p. 121.
[12] Muhy al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi (a), op. cit., p. 52.
[13] Muhy al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi (b), al-Futuhat al-Makkiyah, v. III, p. 238.
[14] Muhy al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi (a), op. cit., p. 56.
[15] Ibid., pp. 66-78.
[16] Muhy al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi (b), op. cit., v. IV, p. 227.
[17] Ibid., p. 227-8.
[18] The Holy Quran chapter al-Sajdah verses 24.
[19] Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Madarij al-Salikin bayn Manazil Iyyaka Na’budu wa Iyyaka Nasta’in, pp. 124-5.
[20] Ibid., pp. 128-9.
[21] Ibid., p. 129.

Read More...

Religion and Din

In welcoming newly-born baby, Farzan Esfandiar

Following Huntington’s theory, the core of any civilization is what is recognized as religion,[1] which, without referring to any definition given by scholars, is commonly understood as reference to the Divine. This gives an impression of its primary importance in shaping every aspect of human life. Nevertheless, its meaning is still blurry and this has been more so by globalization which undermines most of traditional values. For religion is determinant part of, broadly put, any social order, it is interesting to find out what religion is, understood within its Latin root and its derivational forms in the Western. As comparison, it will be tried also to examine the concept of din comprehended within Islamic understanding, which is commonly translated as ‘religion’, yet it has different meaning.
A number of difficulties has been felt by scholars who try to define the word religion. Anthony Thiselton identifies obstacles to be, at least, three facts. The first is diversity of what is to be called as religion. The second is the impossibility of value-neutral knowledge used in study of religion. The third is the usage of sociological or ‘ideological criticism’ approach in understaning religion rather than theological or philosophical approaches.[2] In explaining religion, many various definitons show presuppositions marked by background of the person who makes the definition. It is either academic or dogmatic.[3]




As starting point, it is proper to list some meanings offered by dictionary. Funk and Wagnall’s dictionary describe religion as “A belief in an invisible superhuman power” which brings to man responsible and dependent feeling and consciousness, morality and practices, resulting from that belief.[4] Starting from other direction, Nuttall’s Standard Dictionary of the English Language defines religion as “A habitual, all pervading sense of dependence on, reverence for, and responsibility to, a higher power; or a mode of thinking, feeling and acting, which respects, trusts in, and strives after, the Divine, or God, any system of faith and worship”.[5] From these two different definitions, we can understand that religion comprise of some elements, that is, a belief in Divine; from and toward which spring feelings, moralities, and, for some, modes of thinking; all these result in pratices and worships. Therefore, there are two dimensions of religion, namely, exoteric and esoteric. The first is visible and observable to other people; moralities, practices and worships, while the second is concealed; belief and feelings.
Dealing with formal aspect of religion, Kant defines it as “the sum of all duties as divine commands”.[6] From its psychological and anthropological aspect, Schleiermacher offers other explanation of religion as “the highest are unlocked”, and, furthermore, he differentiates between culture and art on one hand and religion on the other, saying that the former is produced by human creativity and the latter sense and taste for the Infinite. From psychological and ontological perspective, it is consciousness encouraging relationality between persons and between them and God. It is “neither a knowing or a doing, but a modification of feeling or of immediate . . . consciousness” and is “more, but not less, than a feeling and immediacy (Gefuhl) of absolute dependence on God”.[7]
As to term din, it has different meaning as its Western counterpart, that is, religion. Since Arabic, as other semitic language, has very structured root system, we have to trace its origin and diverse forms and meanings, from which, then, we can derive its full meaning. Its verb, dana, has three forms in relation to the object. It is self-transitive, which signifies judiciousness, power and its relating meanings. When the word dana is transitive with lam, it indicates submission and obedience. When it is transitive with ba’, it denotes confessing a belief and acting accordingly. These meanings can be summed up as submissiveness, that is, viewing the first meaning, compulsion of submission (ilzam al-inqiyad); considering the second, it is commitment to submission; and the third is the principle by which submission is done.[8]
Similar to the description of din given by Darraz is al-Attas’. He identifies four main significances of din, out of numerous meanings which although seemingly contrary to each other are nevertheless related, constituting one harmonious unity. They are indebtedness, submissiveness, judicious power, and natural inclination.[9] To understand these coherently, we have to go back to the doctrine of primordial covenant sealed by human being in its pre-existent condition elucidated in the Holy Quran.[10]
As a conclusion we may say that concept of religion understood in the West is based on inquiry of the so-called phenomenology of religions, and fails to give full explanation when it comes to speak about divine and metaphysics, since its methodology neither affirms belief in one particular metaphysical system nor regards it as reliable in ‘scientific’ investigation. Whereas the concept of din is grasped within Quranic framework, which can be scientifically proven by examing its semantical interconnection in Arabic language.

endnotes
[1] Samuel P. Huntington, the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 42.
[2] Anthony Thiselton, A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 255-6.
[3] Ibid., p. 185.
[4] Ron Hubbard, Scientology of Religion, p. 8
[5] Ibid., p. 9.
[6] Martin Moors, Kant on Religion in the Role of Moral Schematism, in Philosophy and Religion in German Idealism, p. 28.
[7] Anthony Thiselton, op. cit., pp. 257-8.
[8] Muhammad Abdullah Darraz, al-Din Buhuts Mumahhidah li Dirasah Tarikh al-Adyan, pp. 61-2.
[9] S.M.N. Al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam, pp. 41-2.
[10] Al-A’raf (7): 172. for extensive explanation on din within Islamic context, read S.M.N. Al-Attas, ibid., pp. 41-57.

Read More...

Islamic Political Theory: a Preliminary Note

Islam is not merely a religion, in the Western sense of the word. The failure of comprehending the nature of Islam will bring about confusion of many concepts relating to it. One of the most misunderstood is the Islamic theory concerning political and govermental affair. To fully grasp it, we need to first understand Islam in general to capture to context within which we put the political theory. It is important by virtue of its unifying nature and pervasiveness extending to all aspect of human being, and public affair is one of human aspects regulated by Islam. Unlike Christianity, Islam does not ever recognize, both conceptually and historically, what is known in the West as separation between church and state. The Islamic teaching is all-pervading and this means that Islam has set principles to every aspect of human in relating with God, himself, society, and state. Some rules are clear, explicit, and unchangeable, such those relating with religious practice, while others only detemines general rules to follow, like those of social affair.
Through Quranic revelation and exemplary life of the Prophet saw., God Almighty has guided Muslims and provides them with creed, ritual and moral injunctions to direct Muslims’ life. The most central to Islamic teaching is the principle of tawhid, which originally means the oneness of God but has direct impact to the everything. It is this faith that makes up entire life of a Muslim as an individual as well as a part of community. This faith is also reflected in the whole principles of Islamic teaching known as shari’a, which no part of it can be comprehended or applied separately. It must be understood in its entirety and implemented totally. Therefore, it is not possible to conceptualize Islamic political idea and Islamic state apart from Islamic teaching as a whole.



There is no distinction in Islam between private and public affair, as experienced in Western history. All are connected each other and not to be differentiated. In contrast to what happen to Christian, to be a good Muslim does not mean to abstain from worldly concern; on the contrary it means to fully get involved in daily life and making good for human being.
In what follows, I will try to describe some aspect of Islamic political theory grounded on its two primary Sources, as other areas are. For the philosophical perspective, Islamic political theory is normative in the sense that it is essentially based on and aimed at ethical ends. Islamic ethical values, being the basis, the way, and the end, have shaped patterns in which Islamic govermental system have been built. The highest ethical ideal in Islam is to worship Him, for human being was created to do so. This means to be completely submissive to His will as revealed in the Holy Quran and exemplified by the Prophet saw. These Two Sources comprise the whole shari’a and later were, and still are, elaborated by the Muslim scholars. This ethical ideal is the foundation on which Muslim community builds its allegiance and emotional tie, unifying them into a single brotherhood sharing the same moral code which is ultimately established on the belief in one God, regardless of their tribal, ethnological, and geographical background.
Practically, Islam provides its adherents with certain laws and institutions in which to make sure the implementation of Islamic social order and moral development. These laws and institutions are largely influenced by the Islamic culture which is basically is inspired by Islamic ethical norms. Muslim society is closely related to religious ideal of Islam. Social order resulted from Muslim society then forms Islamic polity, which example are the Prophet and the first Islamic community. This social order is accomplished by contractual structure and, as in other Islamic aspect, built upon an ethical ideal.
As for as sovereignty in Islamic state, so to speak, is concerned, it is Almighty God who has the absolute and ultimate authority in every aspect of it. The faith in unity of God gives rise to the doctrine of the unity of human race, since all human beings belong to Him. And for Muslims is to act as His vicegerents and become leaders of the rest of humankind. For their guidance to do this task, they have been guided by the Quran, the verifier and guardian of previous scripture, and the Sunna of the Prophet saw. Teleogically speaking, the state of God is for the refinement of the world order and lifting humankind to the better condition in this world as well as in the hereafter. The shari’ah is the means by which Islamic state strives to reach this goal. This means that, in Islamic state, religion, i.e. Islam, plays central role touching all spheres of its citizens.
Since the real sovereignty is in God’s hand, no one in Islamic society, not the whole Community has right to assert sovereignty, unless under the sovereignty of God. This supreme sovereignty is granted to the consensus of the Community, which choose one of them to be their leader and have privilege to abolish him, since the leader is not excepted from being the subject of law to which all people have to obey. He is elected and adhered to as long as he perform what he should do according to the law of the shari’a, from which the Community and the leader are deprived. This kind of equal status and civil society is the characteristic of Islamic politics. Instead of making a set of law, the responsibility of the Community and the leader is to implement the Rule of God (the shari’a) according to the Book of God and the traditions of the Prophet. The terms of Islamic polity are taken from the Quran and the Sunna, and so are the management of doing affairs of the state. The leader must consult the Majlis Shura (consultative group of ulama) in running state affairs. The same is applied with regard to material wealth issue, which has to be circulated among all, not only among the rich.
The constitution in Islamic state can neither be amended nor modified, since it is the Quran and the Sunna. But, at the same time, it is adaptable to all conditions, by virtue of both Sources. To run this constitution, there must be people who have deep understanding of the Sources and, therefore, they must be Muslims. The non-Muslims in an Islamic state have the equal civil rights as their Muslim counterparts and enjoy the same protection from the state.
has right to make law in the name of God.

Read More...

Defining Secularization and Secularism

To describe both terms, it is imperative upon us to first define their root, that is, secular. According to Al-Attas what is emphasized in this term is condition in this particular time seen as historical process [1]. According to Jose Casanova, it is a category by which we define the entirety of contemporary Western civilization, that is, from theologico-philosophical, legal-political, and cultural-anthropological aspect of it. And as Azzam Tamimi has rightly shown, this secular notion cannot be correctly comprehended outside the Western civilization context. Thus, to speak the concept of secular is first to understand it within the particular context of Western civilization. However, this humble writing is not intended to deeply discuss it; instead it merely tries to talk about several definitions concerning secularization and secularism offered by scholars. Both terms will be treated as something related and, many times, overlapping each other.



Secularization is generally regarded as a process of differentiation between “religious” and “secular”. We can speak of it, utilizing categories made by Jose Casanova, through three perspectives; theologico-philosophical, cultural-anthropological, and legal-political. From the first angle, Al-Attas say that secularization is liberation of human reason and language from control of something religious and metaphysical; and turning human attention from the world beyond into this world. In somewhat different context, Tamimi, when talking about object of secularization within Arab society, characterize it as “to effect a complete break with the past”, i.e., to set apart Muslims’ consciousness from their past, the Islamic Tradition. Linked to this category also is description of modern secularism given by Barry Kosmin, which, according to him, is divided into two types; hard and soft secularism. The former considers religious propositions as epistemologically illegitimate, since not warranted by both religion itself and experience. The latter holds the impossibility of reaching absolute truth and, consequently, skepticism and tolerance should be standard by which we look at other’s opinion. According to Ikado Fujio, it is "the process whereby transcendental sources of value come to be expressed by the use of future-oriented symbol systems, such as `hope'.” Thus, secularization involves setting apart of human intellectually and individually from religious control, the Tradition, religious propositions, and religious consciousness.
Another approach to understand secularization is through cultural-anthropological perspective, which is, in many cases, more apparent. Culturally it means “the disappearance of religious determination of the symbols of cultural integration”. In Arab context, it is “the marginalization of Islam or its exclusion from the process of re-structuring society during both the colonial and post-independence periods”. This suggests that Islam is excluded as much as possible from shaping the society. It is also differentiation of things “secular”; like economy, science, art, entertainment, health, and welfare; from those “religious”; such as ecclesiastical institution and church’s activities. It also means “the transfer of activities from religious to secular institutions, such as a shift in provision of social services from churches to the government.” We may conclude that secularization culturally and socially is the disappearance of religious symbols, omission of religion’s role in shaping society, differentiation between what is secular, i.e., related to this world only and what is religious, i.e., related to the world beyond, and moving social activities from religious to secular institutions.
From legal-political perspective, secularization is “the taking over of church property by the state for secular purposes”. It also means separating government from religious institutions and is choosing man-made law as a state constitution instead of laws which are derived or inspired by religion. It is, thus, overtaking the governmental role of religion by the state governed solely by human reasoning.
With regard to secularism, many definitions have been suggested by scholar. Here I will employ

Read More...